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Background
School environments are thought to play an important role in the community spread of airborne
infections such as influenza because of the high mixing rates of school children. The closure
of schools, therefore, has been proposed as an efficient mitigation strategy, with however high
associated social and economic costs: hence alternative, less disruptive interventions are highly
desirable. The recent availability of high-resolution contact networks in school environments
provides an opportunity to design micro-interventions and compare the outcomes of alternative
mitigation measures.
Methods and Findings
We consider mitigation measures that involve the targeted closure of school classes or grades based
on readily available information such as the number of symptomatic infectious children in a class.
We focus on the specific case of a primary school for which we have high-resolution data on the
close-range interactions of children and teachers. We simulate the spread of an influenza-like illness
in this population by using an SEIR model with asymptomatics, and compare the outcomes of
different mitigation strategies. We find that targeted class closure affords strong mitigation effects:
closing a class for a fixed period of time – equal to the sum of the average infectious and latent
durations – whenever two infectious individuals are detected in that class decreases the attack
rate by almost 70% and significantly decreases the probability of a severe outbreak. The clo-
sure of all classes of the same grade mitigates the spread almost as much as closing the whole school.
Conclusions
Targeted class closure strategies based on readily available information on symptomatic subjects
and on limited information on mixing patterns, such as the grade structure of the school, can be
almost as effective as whole-school closure, at a much lower cost. This may inform public health
policies for the management and mitigation of influenza-like outbreaks in the community.
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2I. INTRODUCTION
It has been long known [1, 2] that children play an important role in the community spread of
infectious disease, in particular of influenza. The many contacts children have with one another
at school increase their risk of being infected by several airborne transmissible pathogens, and
make schools an important source of transmission to households, from where the disease can spread
further. For instance, during the 2009 H1N1 pandemic, a correlation was observed [3] between the
opening dates of schools and the onset of widespread transmission of H1N1 in the US. Similarly,
the timing of school terms, with the corresponding changes in contact patterns, has been shown to
explain the evolution of the H1N1 epidemic in the UK [4].
School closure is thus regarded as a viable mitigation strategy for epidemics [5, 6], especially
in the case of novel pandemics for which pharmaceutical interventions, such as vaccines, are not
readily available and delaying disease spread is a priority. The impact of school closure on the
spread of infectious disease has been studied using historical data [7–12], comparison of contact
patterns during week days, weekends and holiday periods [4, 13, 14], and agent-based models at
different scales [9, 15–17]. School closure, however, comes with a steep socio-economic cost, as
parents need to take care of their children and might be forced to take time off work. This can even
have a detrimental impact on the availability of public health staff. Such harmful side effects have
led to question the effective benefit of school closure [18, 19] and prompt research on the design
and evaluation of non-pharmaceutical low-cost mitigation strategies.
In this context, the availability of data on contacts between school children is a crucial asset
on two accounts: First, even limited information on mixing patterns within and between classes
or grades can suggest more refined strategies than whole-school closure. Second, high-resolution
contact data allow to develop individual-based computational models of disease spread that can be
used to test and compare different mitigation strategies. Because of this, over the last few years
a great deal of effort has been devoted to gathering data on human contact patterns in various
environments [20], using methods that include diaries and surveys [14, 21–29], and more recently
wearable sensors that detect close-range proximity [30–32] and face-to-face contacts [33–37].
In this study we use a high-resolution contact network measured by using wearable sensors in
a primary school [36]. The data show that children spend more time in contact with children of
the same class (on average three times more than with children of other classes) and of their own
grade [36]. This is expected to be a rather general feature of schools, due both to age homophily [38]
and schedule constraints, and suggests that transmission events might take place preferentially
within the same class or grade. We thus consider targeted and reactive mitigation strategies in
which one class or one grade is temporarily closed whenever symptomatic individuals are detected.
To evaluate the effectiveness of such micro-interventions we use our high-resolution contact network
data [33, 36] to build an individual-based model of epidemic spread, and we compare, in simulation,
the performance and impact on schooling of different targeted mitigation strategies with the closure
of the whole school.
II. METHODS
High-resolution contact network data
We use a high-resolution contact network measured by the SocioPatterns collaboration [33] us-
ing wearable proximity sensors in a primary school. The sensors detect the face-to-face proximity
relations (“contacts”) of individuals with a 20-seconds temporal resolution [34]. The time-resolved
3contact network considered here, analyzed in Ref. [36], describes the contacts among 232 children
and 10 teachers in a primary school in Lyon, France, and covers two days of school activity (Thurs-
day, October 1st and Friday, October 2nd 2009). The school is composed by 5 grades, each of them
comprising two classes, for a total of 10 classes. Contacts events are individually resolved, and their
starting and ending times are known up to the 20-second resolution of the measurement system.
Extending the temporal span of the empirical data
Realistic parameters for the infectious and latent periods of influenza-like disease are of the order
of days. Since the dataset we use only spans two school days, our numerical simulations will unfold
over time scales longer than the duration covered by the contact dataset. To address this problem,
several possibilities to extend in time the empirical contact data have been explored [39]. Here
we consider a simple periodic repetition of the 2-day empirical data, modified to take into account
specific features of the school environment under study. First, since our data only describes contacts
during school hours, we assume that children are in contact with the general community for the rest
of the day. Moreover, children in France do not go to school on Wednesday, Saturday and Sunday:
on these days, therefore, children are also considered in contact with the general community. Overall
the temporal contact patterns we use have the following weekly scheme:
i) Monday and Tuesday correspond to the first and second day of the empirical dataset: between
8.30am and 5:00pm contacts within the school are described by the empirical data. Outside
of this interval, children are assumed to be isolated from one another and in contact with the
community.
ii) Wednesday: children are in contact with the community for the entire day.
iii) Thursday and Friday: the first and second day of the empirical dataset are repeated as in i).
iv) Saturday and Sunday: children are in contact with the community for the entire weekend.
The above weekly sequence is repeated as many times as needed. Other extension procedures include
partial reshuffling of the participants’ identities across days [39], to model the partial variability
of each individual’s contacts from one day to the next. Here we limit our investigation to the
simple scheme outlined above, because a repetition procedure is appropriate to model a school
environment, where activities follow a rather repetitive daily and weekly rhythm, and each child is
expected to interact every day with approximately the same set of individuals, namely the members
of her/his class and her/his acquaintances in other classes.
Epidemic model
To simulate the spread of an influenza-like disease we consider a stochastic SEIR model with
asymptomatic individuals, with no births, nor deaths, nor introduction of individuals [40]. In such a
compartmental model each individual at a given time can be in one of five possible states: susceptible
(S), exposed (E), infectious and symptomatic (I), infectious and asymptomatic (A), and recovered
(R). Whenever a susceptible individual is in contact with an infectious one, s/he can become
exposed at rate β if the infectious individual is symptomatic, and β/2 if the infectious individual
is asymptomatic. Exposed individuals, who cannot transmit the disease, become infectious with a
fixed rate µ, where 1/µ represents the average duration of the latent period. Exposed individuals
4becoming infectious have a probability pA of being asymptomatic (A) and a probability 1− pA of
being symptomatic (I). Both symptomatic and asymptomatic infectious individuals recover at a
fixed rate γ (1/γ is the average duration of the infectious period) and acquire permanent immunity
to the disease.
As mentioned above, our data describe human contacts only within the school premises. During
the spread of an epidemic in the community, however, exposure to infectious individuals also occurs
outside of school. Accordingly, we consider that individuals have a generic risk of being contami-
nated by infectious individuals outside of the school. For simplicity, here we assume that this risk
is uniform and we introduce it into the model through a fixed rate of infection βcom. That is, the
probability that a susceptible individual, during a time interval dt, becomes exposed due to random
encounters outside of school is βcom dt.
Finally, we assume that symptomatic individuals are detected at the end of each day. They
are subsequently isolated until they recover and therefore cannot transmit the disease anymore.
Asymptomatic individuals, on the other hand, cannot be detected and thus are not isolated. Each
simulation starts with a completely susceptible population, except for a single, randomly chosen
infectious individual, chosen as symptomatic with probability 1− pA and asymptomatic with prob-
ability pA.
We consider the following parameter values for the SEIR model: β = 3.5 · 10−4 s−1, βcom =
2.8 · 10−9 s−1, 1/µ = 2 days, 1/γ = 4 days. The fraction of infected asymptomatic individuals
is set to pA = 1/3. These parameter values are in line with those used to describe influenza-like
illnesses [41].
Moreover, we carry out the following sensitivity analyses: First, we consider a larger value of
βcom while keeping fixed the values of the other parameters, to investigate the role of the generic
risk of infection in the community. Second, we report in the Supplementary Text the results
obtained with two different sets of parameters corresponding to faster spreading processes, namely:
(i) β = 6.9 · 10−4 s−1; βcom = 2.8 · 10−9 s−1; 1/µ = 1 day; 1/γ = 2 days, pA = 1/3, and (ii)
β = 1.4 · 10−3 s−1, βcom = 2.8 · 10−9 s−1, 1/µ = 0.5 day, 1/γ = 1 day, pA = 1/3.
Mitigation measures
The baseline mitigation measure is given by the isolation of symptomatic children at the end of
each day. We consider the three following additional strategies: whenever the number of symp-
tomatic infectious individuals detected in any class reaches a fixed threshold,
(i) the class is closed for a fixed duration (“targeted class closure” strategy);
(ii) the class and the other class of the same grade are both closed for a fixed duration (“targeted
grade closure” strategy);
(iii) the entire school is closed for a fixed duration (“whole school closure” strategy).
In all cases, the children affected by the closure are considered to be in contact with the community
during the closure period – with the exception of detected infectious cases – and therefore they
have a probability per unit time βcom of acquiring the disease. When the closure is over, the class
(or grade) is re-opened and the corresponding children go back to school.
For benchmarking purposes, in the Supplementary Text we also consider strategies based on
random class closures: whenever the number of symptomatic infectious individuals detected in any
class reaches a fixed threshold,
5(iv) one random class, different from the one in which symptomatic individuals are detected, is
closed (“random class closure” strategy)
(v) the class and a randomly chosen one in a different grade are closed (“mixed class closure”
strategy).
Note that during the course of an epidemic, in principle, several classes can be closed at the
same time or successively, but once a class (or grade) is re-opened, we do not allow it to be closed
again. Similarly, when using the whole-school closure strategy, we assume for simplicity that once
the school is re-opened it cannot be closed again.
All of the closure strategies describe above depend on two parameters: the closure-triggering
threshold, i.e., the number of symptomatic individuals required to trigger the intervention, and the
duration of the closure. We will explore thresholds of 2 or 3 symptomatic individuals and closure
durations ranging from 24 to 144 hours (from 1 to 6 days). Closure durations are specified in terms
of absolute time: for instance, a 72 hours closure starting on a Thursday night spans the following
Friday, Saturday and Sunday and ends on the next Monday morning.
Simulation and analysis
For each set of model parameters for the SEIR model, and for each set of parameters of every
mitigation strategy we simulate 5000 realizations of the epidemic process. We compare the perfor-
mance of different strategies by measuring (i) the fraction of stochastic realizations that yield an
attack rate (fraction of individuals affected by the disease) higher than 10%, and (ii) the average
number of final cases in the population. We also quantify the burden of each strategy by computing
the number of lost schools days. defined by adding up the number of school days missed by each
class affected by the intervention. A closure of one class during a normal school day counts as 1
lost day, whereas the closure of the entire school counts as 10 lost days, as there are 10 classes in
the school. We do not count Wednesdays and week-ends spanned by the closure interval.
III. RESULTS
Here we provide results corresponding to the parameters values β = 3.5 · 10−4 s−1, βcom =
2.8 · 10−9 s−1, 1/µ = 2 days, 1/γ = 4 days. The results for the two other sets of parameters are
qualitatively similar and are discussed in the Supplementary Text.
In Table I we report the fraction of stochastic realizations that lead to an attack rate (AR) higher
than 10%, for each mitigation strategy and each set of parameter values of the strategy (closure
triggering threshold and closure duration). As a baseline, we also report the attack rate obtained
when no closure is implemented, i.e., when the only mitigation measure is the isolation of symp-
tomatic individuals at the end of each school day. Even when no closure strategy is implemented
the majority of realisations (65.4%) do not lead to a large outbreak. The probability of a large
outbreak is reduced by all of the closure strategies. We observe a larger reduction for smaller values
of the closure-triggering threshold and for longer closure durations. On closing whole grades (2
classes) rather than individual classes we report a smaller percentage of realizations leading to large
outbreaks.
In Table II we complement the above results by reporting, for each strategy and parameter choice,
the final number of cases (averages and confidence intervals) for realizations leading to an attack
rate larger than 10%. For small enough closure triggering thresholds and long enough closure
6Closure strategy Targeted class Targeted grade Whole school
(threshold, duration)
No closure 34.6 34.6 34.6
3, 24 h 30.5 29.7 26.0
3, 48 h 28.1 23.5 23.2
3, 72 h 23.4 18.4 14.8
3, 96 h 23.5 20.3 13.0
3, 120 h 20.1 17.3 7.5
3, 144 h 19.7 16.3 5.6
2, 24 h 28.6 27.0 22.9
2, 48 h 22.0 21.6 17.8
2, 72 h 17.4 16.2 14.4
2, 96 h 13.6 11.2 11.0
2, 120 h 10.2 7.2 3.2
2, 144 h 11.6 6.8 1.6
TABLE I. Percentage of realizations leading to an attack rate higher than 10%, for different mitigation
strategies and for various closure-triggering thresholds and closure durations. Parameter values: β =
3.5 · 10−4 s−1, βcom = 2.8 · 10−9 s−1, 1/µ = 2 days, 1/γ = 4 days, pA = 1/3.
durations, all closure strategies achieve a strong reduction of the final epidemic size. Strategies
affecting more classes also have a stronger effect, but in those cases we observe large confidence
intervals and large overlap of the epidemic sizes for different choices of the strategy parameters. In
particular, for small closure-triggering thresholds the targeted class and targeted grade strategies
yield reductions in the number of large outbreaks that are similar to those observed for the closure
of the whole school.
Figures 1 and 2 display the the temporal evolution of the median number of infectious individuals
for several mitigation strategies, when only realizations leading to an attack rate higher than 10%
are considered. Figure 1 shows the effect of closure duration for the targeted class and targeted
grade strategies at a fixed closure-triggering threshold of 3 symptomatic cases. Longer closures
lead to shorter and smaller epidemic peaks. Closure durations of 5 or 6 days (120 and 144 hours,
respectively) lead to very similar epidemic curves. Figure 2, on the other hand, compares the
epidemic curves for the targeted class, targeted grade and whole school strategies at fixed closure-
triggering threshold and closure duration parameters. The targeted class closure strategy already
yields a large reduction of the epidemic peak, and this reduction is only slightly improved by the
targeted grade closure and whole school closure strategies (for the same closure durations).
Finally, in Table III we report the impact on the schooling system of each closure strategy,
quantified by the average number of lost school days aggregated over all affected classes. In all
cases, a high percentage of realizations lead to zero impact, corresponding to (i) situations in which
the outbreak stays confined and the closure-triggering threshold is never reached in any class, or
(ii) to cases in which the closure happens on days during which the school is scheduled to be closed
(Wednesdays or week-ends). Whenever schooldays are effectively lost, we observe a much greater
impact for the whole school closure than for the alternative strategies of closing one class or one
grade only.
7Closure strategy Targeted class Targeted grade Whole school
(threshold, duration)
No closure 179 [149,203] 179 [149,203] 179 [149,203]
3, 24 h 162 [122,199] 166 [112,196] 170 [151,202]
3, 48 h 135 [48,197] 138 [40,188] 162 [43,199]
3, 72 h 101 [33,186] 103 [30,177] 146 [28,198]
3, 96 h 92 [29,184] 88 [26,169] 120 [27,195]
3, 120 h 75 [29,170] 62 [25,163] 67 [26,192]
3, 144 h 71 [26,168] 58 [24,161] 55 [25,180]
2, 24 h 165 [91,195] 170 [141,199] 173 [139,198]
2, 48 h 124 [32,179] 142 [35,191] 170 [62,199]
2, 72 h 96 [30,170] 113 [29,180] 149 [48,201]
2, 96 h 75 [27,152] 94 [26,184] 141 [31,196]
2, 120 h 69 [25,140] 73 [25,181] 133 [30,195]
2, 144 h 51 [27,111] 52 [26,138] 57 [25,192]
TABLE II. Average final number of cases, computed for realizations leading to an attack rate higher than
10%. In square brackets we provide the 5th and 95th percentiles. Parameter values: β = 3.5 · 10−4 s−1,
βcom = 2.8 · 10−9 s−1, 1/µ = 2 days, 1/γ = 4 days, pA = 1/3.
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FIG. 1. Temporal evolution of the median number of infectious individuals for several closure durations, at
a fixed closure-triggering threshold of 3 symptomatic cases. Left: targeted class closure. Right: targeted
grade closure. Only runs with an attack rate (AR) higher than 10% are taken into account. Parameter
values: β = 3.5 · 10−4 s−1, βcom = 2.8 · 10−9 s−1, 1/µ = 2 days, 1/γ = 4 days, pA = 1/3.
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FIG. 2. Temporal evolution of the median number of infectious individuals for the targeted class, targeted
grade, and whole school closure strategies, at a fixed closure-triggering threshold of 3 infectious individuals
and closure duration of 144 hours (6 days). The no-closure scenario is provided for reference. Only
realizations with an attack rate (AR) higher than 10% are taken into account. Parameter values: β =
3.5 · 10−4 s−1, βcom = 1.4 · 10−8 s−1, 1/µ = 2 days, 1/γ = 4 days, pA = 1/3.
Effect of the risk of infection in the community
As mentioned in the Methods section, to assess the role of the risk of infection due to contacts in
the community (as opposed to those at school), we consider a set of parameter values where βcom is
increased five-fold with respect to the previous results. That is, we use the values β = 3.5 ·10−4 s−1,
βcom = 1.4 ·10−8 s−1, 1/µ = 2 days, 1/γ = 4 days, pA = 1/3. Tables IV and V report the results we
obtain with this higher value of βcom for the targeted closure strategies. The probability of a large
outbreak is much higher than in the previous case (as shown by comparing Table IV with Table I).
This probability is reduced by the targeted closure strategies, but remains comparatively large. As
observed for the smaller βcom, the decrease in the probability of a large outbreak is larger for longer
closure durations, for smaller closure-triggering thresholds, and for closures involving more classes.
In the case of epidemics reaching more than 10% of the population, however, Table V shows
that the targeted class and targeted grade closure strategies lead to smaller attack rates than the
whole school closure strategy. Figure 3 gives more insight into this point by showing the epidemic
curve for realizations with a final attack rate larger than 10%, for the targeted and school closure
strategies with a closure duration of 144 hours and a closure-triggering threshold of 3 infectious
individuals. The effect of the targeted class and grade closure strategies is similar to the case of
9Closure strategy Targeted class Targeted grade Whole school
(Threshold, duration)
3, 24 h 2.14 (3.27) [0-9] 2.34 (3.58) [0-10] 2.50 (4.33) [0-10]
3, 48 h 3.04 (4.83) [0-13] 3.00 (5.12) [0-14] 4.42 (7.26) [0-20]
3, 72 h 3.01 (5.17) [0-15] 3.21 (5.44) [0-16] 5.38 (8.13) [0-20]
3, 96 h 4.49 (7.62) [0-22] 4.93 (8.21) [0-24] 8.10 (11.5) [0-30]
3, 120 h 4.50 (8.41) [0-26] 5.20 (9.06) [0-28] 9.38 (13.4) [0-40]
3, 144 h 4.67 (8.72) [0-27] 5.33 (9.41) [0-28] 9.60 (13.7) [0-40]
2, 24 h 2.18 (3.36) [0-9] 2.31 (3.46) [0-10] 3.38 (4.73) [0-10]
2, 48 h 2.42 (4.37) [0-13] 3.05 (4.77) [0-14] 4.60 (7.16) [0-20]
2, 72 h 2.57 (4.77) [0-15] 3.44 (5.45) [0-16] 7.12 (8.54) [0-20]
2, 96 h 3.14 (6.11) [0-20] 3.92 (6.80) [0-22] 8.64 (11.2) [0-30]
2, 120 h 3.55 (6.37) [0-18] 4.38 (7.68) [0-22] 9.32 (12.4) [0-30]
2, 144 h 4.32 (7.38) [0-22] 4.63 (7.61) [0-22] 11.54 (13.7) [0-40]
TABLE III. Number of lost school days for the various closure strategies. Standard deviations are given
in parentheses and 5th and 95th percentiles in square brackets. Parameter values: β = 3.5 · 10−4 s−1,
βcom = 2.8 · 10−9 s−1, 1/µ = 2 day, 1/γ = 4 days, pA = 1/3.
Closure strategy Targeted class Targeted grade Whole school
(threshold, duration)
No closure 65.9 65.9 65.9
3, 24 h 65.0 62.4 64.1
3, 48 h 58.7 59.0 58.9
3, 72 h 58.0 57.4 53.7
3, 96 h 58.1 56.3 44.0
3, 120 h 56.4 51.2 38.9
3, 144 h 55.3 51.0 38.7
2, 24 h 65.7 59.0 60.7
2, 48 h 57.3 56.1 53.2
2, 72 h 49.7 49.5 45.3
2, 96 h 46.7 46.2 43.3
2, 120 h 44.0 37.7 35.9
2, 144 h 41.5 36.8 31.7
TABLE IV. Percentage of realizations leading to an attack rate higher than 10%, for the different mitigation
strategies with several closure-triggering thresholds and closure durations. Parameter values: β = 3.5 ·
10−4 s−1, βcom = 1.4 · 10−8 s−1, 1/µ = 2 days, 1/γ = 4 days, pA = 1/3.
10
Closure strategy Targeted class Targeted grade Whole school
(threshold, duration)
No closure 187 [161,192] 187 [161,192] 187 [161,192]
3, 24 h 173 [142,196] 176 [155,200] 181 [153,200]
3, 48 h 155 [114,185] 157 [69,191] 178 [143,203]
3, 72 h 131 [52,170] 137 [40,188] 169 [37,200]
3, 96 h 118 [100,182] 120 [28,182] 161 [30,200]
3, 120 h 103 [35,164] 100 [29,174] 145 [28,196]
3, 144 h 102 [39,161] 89 [28,173] 126 [26,196]
2, 24 h 176 [145,201] 177 [149,202] 183 [160,203]
2, 48 h 151 [89,186] 158 [89,196] 180 [155,201]
2, 72 h 118 [37,177] 136 [32,189] 179 [149,201]
2, 96 h 111 [30,180] 120 [31,191] 176 [141,202]
2, 120 h 102 [27,168] 106 [27,188] 176 [155,198]
2, 144 h 93 [28,167] 94 [27,185] 174 [88,205]
TABLE V. Average final number of cases for realizations leading to an attack rate higher than 10%, for
different mitigation strategies. In square brackets we provide the 5th and 95th percentiles. Parameter
values: β = 3.5 · 10−4 s−1, βcom = 1.4 · 10−8 s−1, 1/µ = 2 days, 1/γ = 4 days, pA = 1/3.
a smaller βcom: these strategies lead to a smaller and shorter epidemic peak with respect to the
baseline strategy. The epidemic curve for the whole school closure strategy on the other hand is
changed and has now two successive peaks; even if the first one is smaller than for the targeted
strategies, the presence of the second peak leads overall to a larger final attack rate.
IV. DISCUSSION
Since the contacts of children at school play an important role for the propagation of many
infectious diseases in the community, it is crucial to devise efficient and cost-effective mitigation
strategies as an alternative to the closure of whole schools, whose socio-economic costs are often
considered excessive. Inspired by the evidence that, inside one school, children do not mix homoge-
neously but rather spend much more time in contact with their classmates and with other children
from the same age, we have designed targeted closure strategies at the class or grade level, that
are reactively triggered when symptomatic cases are detected. We have simulated the dynamics
of epidemic spread among school children by using an SEIR model on top of a high-resolution
time-resolved contact network measured in a primary school. The model included asymptomatic
individuals and a generic risk of infection due to random contacts with the community when chil-
dren are not at school. Using this model we have studied the targeted strategies for class and grade
closure both in terms of their ability to mitigate the epidemic and in terms of their impact on the
schooling system, measured by the number of cancelled days of class.
All targeted strategies lead to an important reduction in the probability of an outbreak reaching
a large fraction of the population. In the case of large outbreaks, targeted strategies significantly
reduce the median number of individuals affected by the epidemic. The reduction is stronger if the
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FIG. 3. Temporal evolution of the median number of infectious individuals, for the targeted class and
targeted grade closure strategies with a closure-triggering threshold of 3 infectious individuals and a closure
duration of 144 hours (that is, 6 days), compared with the scenario without closure and the whole school
closure strategy with a closure duration of 144 hours. Here β = 3.5 ·10−4s−1, βcom = 1.4 ·10−8s−1, 1/µ = 2
days, 1/γ = 4 days, pA = 1/3. Only realizations with attack rate (AR) larger than 10% are taken into
account.
strategies are triggered by a smaller number of symptomatic cases, and if longer closures durations
are used. While the closure of one class yields a smaller mitigation effect than the closure of the
whole school, the closure of the corresponding grade (two classes) leads to a reduction of large
outbreak probability and a reduction of epidemic size that are similar to those obtained by closing
the entire school, at a much smaller cost in terms of lost class days. In the case of large outbreaks
and large risk of infection in the community, whole-school closure might even lead to a smaller
mitigation effect than targeted grade closure, as more susceptible children would spend more time
in the community, acquiring the infection and subsequently bringing it back into the school upon
re-opening.
A few important points need to be stressed. First, the reactive character of all strategies we
studied, which are triggered by the detection of symptomatic individuals, limits the impact on the
schooling system with respect to a closure of schools scheduled in a top-down fashion by public health
authorities: the latter would be enforced even for schools that are free of infectious individuals.
Second, targeted grade closure has in all cases a much lighter burden, in terms of lost class days,
than whole-school closure. Given also its good performance in the mitigation of outbreaks, it thus
represents an interesting alternative strategy. Finally, we recall that grade closure corresponds
to closing the class in which symptomatic children are detected and the class which has the most
contacts with it. To assess this relation between classes, we do not need the very detailed knowledge
12
of the contact patterns we used in this study: rather, readily available information such as class
schedules and classroom locations [42] may be sufficient to retrieve this information. This has
important public health consequences, as it implies that the targeted mitigation strategies studied
here might actually be carried out in the general case, without high-resolution contact network
data.
Some limitations of this study are worth mentioning. While the strategies we discussed could
be designed and implemented with limited information, they were only tested using one specific
dataset corresponding to one particular school. The high-resolution contact network data we used
only spans two days of school activity, and had to be extended longitudinally by using a repetition
procedure. This technique is commonly used to simulate epidemic spread on temporal data, but
it does introduce strong temporal correlations in the extended dataset and it may fail to correctly
model the day-to-day heterogeneity of contact patterns [39]. While variations in the repetition of
contacts from one day to the next are known to modify the attack rate of an epidemic [43], we
expect that the relative efficiency of the strategies we considered should be robust with respect to
other temporal extensions strategies [39]. Moreover, this limitation should be less of an issue in
school settings, where mixing patterns are shaped by a regular activity schedule and have a strong
periodic character. Another limitation of this study is the simplistic coupling with the community
that we used: our high-resolution contact network does not include contacts happening outside of
school, so we introduced in our model a free parameter that describes a generic risk of transmission
from the community. Even though our results are robust with respect to important variations in
this parameter, it would be desirable to inform the model with empirical data on the contacts that
children have with members of the community, or with one another outside of school.
The limitations described above point to several directions for further research. It would be
interesting to validate the targeted class and grade closure strategies using high-resolution data
describing the contacts of children in other schools and over longer timescales, if such dataset become
available in the future. In particular it would be interesting to consider larger schools, for which
the closure of more than two classes may represent a valid intervention with intermediate impact.
High-resolution measurement of contact patterns within a school could be coupled with surveys
administered to the same children, to estimate their contact rates off-school and to model their
contacts with other individuals of different age classes in the community. Such data could be used
to refine the model used here, but also to design agent-based models at a larger scale (e.g., urban
or geographic), spanning several schools. This would allow to generalize the strategies introduced
in this paper to the case of multiple schools, and to evaluate their relative efficiency, in particular
comparing targeted strategies with the general closure of all schools in the relevant geographical
region. Finally, we have discussed how targeted interventions can be guided by readily-available
information on the school activities and organisational structure. New techniques to tease apart
meso-scale activity patterns in high-resolution contact data [44] could be used to design and guide
targeted intervention aimed not just at closing classes but, for example, at suspending or modifying
specific activities in the school that involve the shared use of spaces (e.g., sports activities, time in
the playground, lunch at the cafeteria, etc.)
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MITIGATION OF INFECTIOUS DISEASE AT SCHOOL:
TARGETED CLASS CLOSURES VS SCHOOL CLOSURES
SUPPLEMENTARY TEXT
Results of the spreading simulations for modified SEIR model parameters
As mentioned in the main text, we report here the results of numerical simulations performed
with different sets of parameters for the SEIR epidemic model, in order to assess the robustness of
the obtained results. We use here
(i) β = 6.9 · 10−4s−1, βcom = 2.8 · 10−9s−1, 1/µ = 1 day, 1/γ = 2 days
(ii) β = 1.4 · 10−3s−1, βcom = 2.8 · 10−9s−1, 1/µ = 0.5 day; 1/γ = 1 day,
and the fraction of infected asymptomatic individuals is pA = 1/3 in both cases. As the average
latent and infectious periods are shorter than for the simulations presented in the main text, the
epidemic will unfold here on shorter timescales.
We implement the same mitigation strategies as in the main text, and, in order to compare their
relative efficiencies, we focus on the fraction of stochastic realizations that yield a global attack rate
higher than 10%, on the final average number of cases and on the temporal evolution of the number
of infectious individuals. We compare the results obtained by implementing the various mitigation
measures with the baseline case, represented by the situation in which the only mitigation strategy
consists in the isolation of the symptomatic individuals once they are detected.
Results
In Table VI and VII we show the fraction of stochastic realizations leading to an attack rate
(AR) higher than 10%, for various mitigation measures, compared with the same result obtained
when no closure was implemented. As found for the set of parameters used in the main text’s
results, the reduction of the probability of a severe outbreak is important for all strategies, and
increases for smaller triggering thresholds and longer closure durations. The closure of the whole
school always leads to the most important effect, but the grade closure has as well a strong impact
on the probability of occurrence of large outbreaks.
Tables VIII and IX give the final number of cases for both parameter sets, computed for the
realisations leading to an attack rate larger than 10% for the various mitigation strategies. All
strategies lead to a reduction in the final number of cases. Interestingly, and similarly to the case
shown in the main text, this reduction is very similar for the various closures (class, grade or whole
school) if the closure triggering threshold is small enough: in cases of large outbreaks, closing only
one class is as effective as closing the whole school. As in the main text, we also note that large
confidence intervals are observed, limiting the predictability of the final number of cases. Finally,
as the duration of the closures is increased, the impact on the spread saturates at a value close to
the sum of the latent and infectious periods, as in the main text.
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Closure strategy Targeted class Targeted grade Whole school
(Threshold, duration)
No closure 26.4 26.4 26.4
3, 24 h 22.8 21.8 21.7
3, 48 h 21.8 17.0 13.3
3, 72 h 18.6 15.8 6.3
3, 96 h 16.6 14.1 5.4
2, 24 h 22.2 21.5 19.7
2, 48 h 16.8 17.0 12.6
2, 72 h 11.9 11.2 3.4
2, 96 h 10.2 8.7 3.5
TABLE VI. Percentage of realizations leading to an attack rate higher than 10%, for the various mitigation
strategies with various thresholds and closure durations. β = 6.9 · 10−4s−1, βcom = 2.8 · 10−9s−1, 1/µ = 1
day, 1/γ = 2 days, pA = 1/3.
Closure strategy Targeted class Targeted grade Whole school
(Threshold, duration)
No closure 13.4 13.4 13.4
3, 24 h 10.0 8.6 6.9
3, 48 h 7.3 6.7 3.2
3, 72 h 8.8 5.9 4.3
2, 24 h 7.4 6.0 4.4
2, 48 h 5.6 3.1 2.3
2, 72 h 5.3 3.2 1.9
TABLE VII. Percentage of realizations leading to an attack rate higher than 10%, for the various mitigation
strategies with various thresholds and closure durations. Here β = 1.4 · 10−3s−1, βcom = 2.8 · 10−9s−1,
1/µ = 0.5 day, 1/γ = 1 day, pA = 1/3.
Figures 4 and 5 complement the results by showing the temporal evolution of the median number
of infectious individuals, for realisations leading to an attack rate larger than 10%.
Figure 4 shows the effect of various closure durations, for a closure triggering threshold of three
symptomatic individuals and for the targeted class and grade closure strategies. The epidemic curve
unfolds on a shorter time-scale than in the case shown in the main text, as expected. As a result,
the various strategies do not change much the epidemic peak timing, and have a smaller influence
on the global duration of the spread, especially for the fastest spread. Moreover, in both cases,
very similar epidemic curves are obtained when the closure duration becomes larger than the sum
of 1/µ and 1/γ, while shorter durations yield a smaller effect. The optimal closure duration is thus
close to the sum of the latent and infectious periods.
Figure 5 finally compares the epidemic curves for the targeted class closure, targeted grade closure,
and whole school closure strategies, for a closure duration of three days and a closure-triggering
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FIG. 4. Temporal evolution of the number of infectious individuals, for various closure durations, in the
case of a closure-triggering threshold equal to 3. Left: targeted class closure; right: targeted grade closure.
Top plots: β = 6.9 · 10−4s−1, βcom = 2.8 · 10−9s−1, 1/µ = 1 day, 1/γ = 2 days, pA = 1/3. Bottom plots:
β = 1.4 · 10−3s−1, βcom = 2.8 · 10−9s−1, 1/µ = 0.5 day, 1/γ = 1 day, pA = 1/3. Only runs with attack rate
(AR) larger than 10% are taken into account.
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Closure strategy Targeted class Targeted grade Whole school
(Threshold, duration)
No closure 154 [106,209] 154 [106,209] 154 [106,209]
3, 24 h 133 [91,194] 131 [90,192] 141 [101,206]
3, 48 h 100 [68,175] 99 [68,174] 111 [72,179]
3, 72 h 71 [39,135] 63 [37,133] 57 [35,129]
3, 96 h 66 [38,124] 58 [37,122] 38 [21,89]
2, 24 h 130 [88,192] 126 [83,189] 141 [103,201]
2, 48 h 94 [67,169] 91 [66,169] 124 [99,197]
2, 72 h 54 [36,120] 52 [36,119] 53 [34,126]
2, 96 h 51 [37,109] 45 [35,104] 43 [33,107]
TABLE VIII. Average final number of cases, computed for the realisations leading to an attack rate larger
than 10% for the various mitigation strategies; the brackets provide the 5th and 95th percentiles. β =
6.9 · 10−4s−1, βcom = 2.8 · 10−9s−1, 1/µ = 1 day, 1/γ = 2 days, pA = 1/3.
Closure strategy Targeted class Targeted grade Whole school
(Threshold, duration)
No closure 61 [26,128] 61 [26,128] 61 [26,128]
3, 24 h 53 [26,98] 51 [27,100] 55 [26,101]
3, 48 h 45 [26,88] 43 [26,68] 39 [25,70]
3, 72 h 45 [26,86] 41 [26,67] 34 [25,48]
2, 24 h 48 [25,85] 47 [26,81] 51 [26,104]
2, 48 h 39 [25,64] 38 [26,63] 41 [26,81]
2, 72 h 38 [26,64] 36 [25,51] 35 [25,48]
TABLE IX. Average final number of cases, computed for the realisations leading to an attack rate larger
than 10%, for the various mitigation strategies; the brackets provide the 5th and 95th percentiles. Here
β = 1.4 · 10−3s−1, βcom = 2.8 · 10−9s−1, 1/µ = 0.5 day, 1/γ = 1 day, pA = 1/3.
threshold of three symptomatic individuals. The peak heights are very similar for the targeted
grade closure strategy and for the closure of the whole school.
Overall, these results represent a very similar phenomenology with respect to the parameters
used in the simulations shown in the main text, indicating the robustness of our results with respect
to changes in the disease parameters and the relevance of targeted class and grade strategies as
alternative measures to the closure of whole schools.
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FIG. 5. Temporal evolution of the number of infectious individuals, for the targeted class and targeted
grade closure strategies with a closure-triggering threshold of 3 infectious individuals and a closure duration
of 72 hours, compared with the scenario without closure and the whole school closure strategy with a closure
duration of 72 hours. Left: β = 6.9 · 10−4s−1, βcom = 2.8 · 10−9s−1, 1/µ = 1 day, 1/γ = 2 days, pA = 1/3.
Right: β = 1.4 · 10−3s−1, βcom = 2.8 · 10−9s−1, 1/µ = 0.5 day, 1/γ = 1 day, pA = 1/3. Only realizations
with attack rate (AR) larger than 10% are taken into account.
Comparison of targeted and random class and grade closures
We consider here strategies based on random closure of classes: whenever the number of symp-
tomatic infectious individuals detected in any class reaches a certain threshold,
(iv) one random class, different from the one in which symptomatic individuals were detected, is
closed (“random class closure” strategy)
(v) this class and a randomly chosen one in a different grade are closed (“mixed class closure”
strategy).
We use here β = 6.9 · 10−4s−1, βcom = 2.8 · 10−9s−1, 1/µ = 1 day, 1/γ = 2 days, pA = 1/3.
Tables X and XI compare the effect of the targeted class and grade closure with the partially
random closure of one or two classes. Closing one class chosen at random (different than the one in
which the infectious individuals are detected) leads only to a marginal decrease in the probability to
obtain an attack rate higher than 10% and in the number of individuals affected by large spreads.
In the mixed strategy on the other hand, the class in which the infectious individuals have been
detected is closed, and a second one, chosen at random in a different grade, is closed as well. This
leads to an effect almost as strong as the targeted grade closure strategy.
Figures 6 and 7 report the temporal evolution of the median number of infectious individuals in
the targeted and random strategies, leading to the same conclusion: the targeted closure of a class
leads to a much smaller peak than the closure of a random class; the mixed strategy leads on the
other hand to an epidemic curve that is very close to the case of a targeted grade closure.
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Closure strategy Targeted class Random class Targeted grade Mixed
(Threshold, duration)
No closure 26.4 26.4 26.4 26.4
3, 24 h 22.8 26.2 21.8 22.1
3, 48 h 21.8 24.4 17.0 18.1
3, 72 h 18.6 26.0 15.8 17.6
3, 96 h 16.6 23.2 14.1 16.5
2, 24 h 22.2 23.8 21.5 22.2
2, 48 h 16.8 24.3 17.0 17.9
2, 72 h 11.9 24.8 11.2 14.4
2, 96 h 10.2 23.8 8.7 13.1
TABLE X. Percentage of runs leading to an attack rate larger than 10% for the targeted and random closure
strategies. β = 6.9 · 10−4s−1, βcom = 2.8 · 10−9s−1, 1/µ = 1 day, 1/γ = 2 days, pA = 1/3.
Closure strategy Targeted class Random class Targeted grade Mixed
(Threshold, duration)
No closure 154 [106,209] 154 [106,209] 154 [106,209] 154 [106,209]
3, 24 h 133 [90,194] 151 [106,207] 131 [90,192] 132 [90,195]
3, 48 h 100 [68,175] 145 [103,201] 99 [68,174] 102 [70,176]
3, 72 h 71 [39,135] 130 [89,193] 63 [37,133] 64 [37,135]
3, 96 h 66 [38,124] 123 [87,191] 58 [37,122] 63 [37,133]
2, 24 h 130 [88,192] 153 [105,207] 126 [83,189] 128 [84,192]
2, 48 h 94 [67,169] 150 [104,207] 91 [66,169] 95 [67,170]
2, 72 h 54 [36,120] 135 [93,190] 52 [36,119] 56 [37,123]
2, 96 h 51 [37,109] 119 [84,189] 45 [35,104] 48 [35,106]
TABLE XI. Average final number of cases of the spread, for realisations with AR > 10%, for the targeted
and random strategies. β = 6.9 · 10−4s−1, βcom = 2.8 · 10−9s−1, 1/µ = 1 day, 1/γ = 2 days, pA = 1/3. The
brackets give the 5th and 95th percentiles.
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FIG. 6. Temporal evolution of the number of infectious individuals for targeted and random class closure
strategies, for a closure-triggering threshold of 3 infectious individuals, compared with the scenario in
which no closure is implemented. The duration of the class closures is 48 hours (Left) and 72 hours (right).
β = 6.9 · 10−4s−1, βcom = 2.8 · 10−9s−1, 1/µ = 1 day, 1/γ = 2 days, pA = 1/3. Only realizations with
attack rate (AR) larger than 10% are taken into account.
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FIG. 7. Temporal evolution of the number of infectious individuals for the targeted grade closure and the
mixed closure strategies, for a closure-triggering threshold of 3 infectious individuals, compared with the
scenario in which no closure is implemented. The duration of the class closures is 48 hours (Left) and 72
hours (right). In the mixed closure strategy, the class in which the infectious individuals are detected is
closed, as well as a second class from a different grade. β = 6.9 ·10−4s−1, βcom = 2.8 ·10−9s−1, 1/µ = 1 day,
1/γ = 2 days, pA = 1/3. Only realizations with attack rate (AR) larger than 10% are taken into account.
